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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED 
THE STATE TO AMEND THE INFORMATION TWO DAYS 
BEFORE TRIAL 
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that the trial court prejudiced and impeded his 
substantial constitutional rights such as the rights to fundamental fairness and due 
process, and the right to present a defense—his theory of the case—to the jury by 
allowing the State to amend the information two days before trial. The State incorrectly 
interprets this issue as being the ability to prepare for trial (Br.App. at 9-11). 
The State claims that Nelson-Waggoner waived his right of review because the 
record is silent as to any discussion or objection as to this issue (Br. Appellee at 7). 
While the record is silent as to any specific objection two days before trial, Nelson-
Waggoner repeatedly petitioned the trial court for a bill of particulars/motion to require 
specification of date and time of offense, and the trial court specifically stated that it 
would not allow the State to change the information because it previously failed to 
narrow the date down any further (R. 196; 467; and 9/21/99 Tr. at 40-43). Nelson-
Waggoner asserts that this Court should nonetheless review this issue under a plain 
error analysis or in the alternative under an "exceptional circumstances" standard due 
to the unique procedural circumstances of this case. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997); see also State v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 
1968) ("[T]here may be exceptional circumstances when errors not excepted to are so 
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clearly erroneous and prejudicial to the fundamental rights of a defendant that an 
appellate court will of its own accord take notice thereof.")-
A. The trial court plainly erred when it accepted the State's theory of the case 
by allowing the state to amend the information two days before trial, thus 
eliminating Nelson-Waggoner's ability to question the credibility of K.W. 
before the jury. 
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that the trial court plainly erred when it stripped him 
of his right to present an alibi defense and of his right to question the credibility of 
K.W. before the jury regarding her preliminary hearing testimony, thereby impeding 
his substantial constitutional rights. 
To demonstrate plain error, Nelson-Waggoner must establish the following: "(i) 
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful...." State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, f 18, 34 P.3d 187 (citation 
omitted). In order to show that the error is harmful, Nelson-Waggoner must 
demonstrate that "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79 at f 18. 
The State cannot amend the criminal information for the purpose of avoiding the 
defendant's alibi defense. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). The 
degree of variance regarding the alleged date of offense which might affecl the 
credibility of the witness and the weight to be given her statements is a question for the 
jury. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394 (Utah, 1982). Furthermore, "It is the exclusive 
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function of the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Webb, 740 P.2d 
65, 84 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1997) ("The 
judging of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is exclusively 
the prerogative of the jury"). 
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that in order for this Court to properly analyze this 
issue it is necessary to review the procedural history of this case set forth in his original 
Brief of Appellant, p. 21-27. Summarily, the alleged victim, K.W., testified at the 
preliminary hearing that she was "definitely sure" the incident occurred on Sunday, 
November 24, 1996—the weekend before Thanksgiving (10/15/97 Tr. at 16). But the 
initial criminal information alleged the incident occurred on or about "November 17 to 
November 30, 1996" (R. at 2). Nelson-Waggoner made repeated requests for a bill of 
particulars/more specification as to the date and time of offense, but the State claimed it 
could not narrow the dates down any further (R. at 196; 471; 9/21/99 Tr. at 40). In 
light of the State's failure to specify a date of the offense, the trial court stated that the 
State is "precluded from having testimony as to the exact date at the time of trial" and 
"if they [the State] have further information forthcoming at trial, they're precluded 
from presenting it. That's the reason for the rule [bill of particulars]" (9/21/99 Tr. at 
40-43). 
After these events took place, Nelson-Waggoner filed a notice of alibi, indicating 
his intent to show that on November 24, 1996, he was out of the state and not with the 
alleged victim (R. at 523-24). After Nelson-Waggoner filed his notice of alibi, giving 
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solid proof that K.W.'s preliminary hearing testimony was incorrect, the trial court 
allowed the State, two days before trial, to amend the criminal information and narrow 
the date to November 17, 1996 (R. at 52). 
Although the State had previously claimed it could not narrow the alleged dates 
in the criminal information, the trial court allowed the State to do so anyway. The 
record demonstrates that the only new information that was possessed by the State 
which would cause them to seek an amendment of the original information was the 
solid evidence that Nelson-Waggoner was out-of-state from November 21-December 3, 
1996. After learning of this solid alibi, the State's theory then shifted from the incident 
occurred on a Sunday "before Thanksgiving" between November 17-November 30, to 
the incident must have occurred on November 17 because Nelson-Waggoner was out-
of-state on November 24. 
The trial court completely accepted the State's theory of the case by allowing the 
information to be amended to solely "November 17, 1996." Not only did this allow the 
State to circumvent Nelson-Waggoner's request for a bill of particulars, but it also 
stripped him of his alibi defense and eliminated his ability to question the credibility of 
K.W. and her preliminary testimony that the incident occurred on November 24. 
In State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771 (Utah 1985), the defendant was originally 
charged by information which alleged that the he sexually abused a child "on or about 
the 4th day of February, 1984." Id. at 772. Two weeks later, after the State learned of 
the defendant's alibi defense to the dates charged, the State amended the information 
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alleging that the offense took place "on or about the first two weeks in February, 
1984." Id. At pretrial, the defendant moved for a bill of particulars, but it was denied. 
Id. 
The defendant in Robbins argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error 
in refusing to grant a bill of particulars to specify when the alleged offense occurred 
because he could not prepare an adequate alibi defense for every day. Id. at 773. This 
Court held that "under the circumstances, the defendant was entitled to know whether 
the change in the information was made in good faith or to avoid the defendant's alibi 
defense." Recognizing that "children are often not able to identify with a high degree 
of reliability" when an event in the past took place, this Court nevertheless held that "it 
is the duty of the trial court to require the State to give the defendant the best 
information it has as to when the alleged crime took place," and that this defendant was 
entitled to a narrower time period "and to some explanation for the change in the 
allegation in the information." Id. However, this Court affirmed the conviction 
because the defendant did not provide this Court with a trial transcript and thus could 
not show prejudicial error. Id. 
In State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1982), this Court referred to State 
v. Bayes, 47 Utah 474, 155 P.2d 335 (1916), where there was a question as to whether 
a 16-year old girl was raped on a Wednesday, or on a Saturday. This Court held in 
Bayes: 
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The act, if occurred at all, was quite unlawful on Wednesday, the 7th, as on 
Saturday, the 10th, of the month. Such a discrepancy might become material in 
a case where the statute of limitations was important; but, under the 
circumstances of this case, the only effect it could have was that it might have 
affected the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given her statements, 
and that question was for the jury. 
Wilson, 642 P.2d at 396 (quoting Bayes, 155 P.2d 335). 
Thus, Robbins clearly stands for the principle that when the State amends a 
criminal information, it must be done in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding 
a defendant's alibi defense. Further, a discrepancy on the date of an alleged offense 
which affects the credibility of the witness is a question for the jury, not for the trial 
court. See Wilson, 642 P.2d at 396. 
In the case at bar, the State had previously asserted that it could not narrow the 
date down any further from November 17-November 30, 1996, and the record is absent 
of any new information obtained by the State other than Nelson-Waggoner's alibi 
defense. It is clear that the State amended the information solely because of Nelson-
Waggoner's alibi for November 24. With Nelson-Waggoner's alibi defense, the State's 
theory of the case changed, and either K.W. was completely mistaken about Nelson-
Waggoner, or she was completely mistaken about the date of the incident, although she 
previously testified she was "definitely sure" it occurred on November 24, 1996 
(10/15/97 Tr. at 16). 
However, rather than allow the jury to decide when and if the assault occurred 
based on all the evidence—including K.W.'s preliminary hearing testimony and Nelson-
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Waggoner's alibi evidence, the trial court adopted the State's theory of the case by 
allowing the information to be amended to a particular date. This effectively stripped 
Nelson-Waggoner of his ability to effectively question K.W.'s credibility and to have 
his theory of the case heard. 
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that he was prejudiced by this error and absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Because the trial 
court amended the information and accepted the State's theory of the case, it effectively 
deprived Nelson-Waggoner a critical opportunity to question K.W.'s credibility and to 
present his theory of the case to the jury. K.W. was the State's main witness against 
Nelson-Waggoner and the only witness that testified the he was involved in the assault. 
By accepting the State's theory of the case, the trial court prejudiced and impeded 
Nelson-Waggoner's substantial constitutional rights such as the right to fundamental 
fairness and due process, and the right to present a defense—his theory of the case—to 
the jury. 
B. This Court should review this error under the "exceptional circumstances" 
doctrine for manifest injustice or alternatively, for manifest injustice under 
Rule 19(e). 
A review of the procedural history shows that this case involves "rare procedural 
anomalies" that amounts to manifest injustice. "There may be exceptional 
circumstances when errors not excepted to are so clearly erroneous and prejudicial to 
the fundamental rights of a defendant that an appellate court will of its own accord take 
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notice thereof." State v. Scott, 22 Utah 2d 27, 28, 447 P.2d 908, 910 (1968). 
Alternatively, this Court may review this issue in order to avoid manifest injustice as 
defined by Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or for plain error as set 
forth in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Jury instructions not 
objected to may be reviewed "to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 19(e). 
Summarily, K.W. testified at the preliminary hearing on October 15, 1997, that 
she was "definitely sure" that the incident took place on Sunday, November 24, 1996, 
the weekend before Thanksgiving, yet Nelson-Waggoner was bound over for trial on 
information alleging the date to be on or about "November 17, 1996, to November 30, 
1996" (10/15/97 Tr. at 16; R. at 2, 48-49). 
Next, Nelson-Waggoner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars on September 2, 
1999, requesting that the State specify with particularity the "place, date and time of the 
commission of the offense against [K.W.]" (R. at 196). On October 1, 1999, Nelson-
Waggoner filed a Motion to Require Specification of Date and Time of Offense (R. at 
467). 
Then, at a hearing to consider the motion for a bill of particulars on September 
21, 1999, the State maintained its position that it could not specify the exact date of the 
offense, although K.W. earlier testified that it was on November 24, 1996 (9/21/99 Tr. 
at 40-43). On October 12, 1999, at another hearing to consider Nelson-Waggoner's 
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other request for a bill of particulars and for specification of date and time of offense, 
the prosecutor stated: 
We have never said...that [K.W.'s] going to testify that it was the 17th. I 
happen to believe that this occurred on the 17th, but she hasn't told us that's 
what she's going to testify to. My anticipation is that she will either say it was 
the 24th or that it was on of—or consistent with her original was to police, that 
she's not sure which day it was. 
(10/12/99 Tr. at 19-20). 
After Nelson-Waggoner filed his Notice of Alibi, the State filed an Amended 
Information changing the date of offense from "November 17,1996, to November 30, 
1996" to "November 17, 1996" (R. at 52). During trial at opening argument, counsel 
for the State specifically mentioned that the offense occurred on November 17, 1996 
(1/10/00 Tr. at 154). Although a stipulation was read to the jury which established that 
Nelson-Waggoner was in Arizona from the night of November 21 until December 3, 
1996, this point was irrelevant because the jury was instructed that the date of offense 
was November 17, 1996 (1/10/00 Tr. at 98; R. at 238). 
These events show rare procedural anomalies and manifest injustice which 
justifies a review by this Court. It is certainly abnormal for the trial court to refuse to 
grant several requests for a bill of particulars due to the State's claim that it cannot 
narrow down any further the alleged date of the offense when the only alleged victim 
already testified it occurred on a specific date. Moreover, the trial court then allows, 
two days before trial, the State to amend the information only after Nelson-Waggoner 
presents a solid alibi defense that he could not have committed the offense on the date 
9 
alleged by K. W. And then at trial, the trial court accepts the State's theory of the case 
by instructing the jury that the alleged offense occurred on November 17, 199. 
Although Nelson-Waggoner repeatedly attempted to force the State to narrow 
down the date of the alleged defense, the trial court denied these motions by stating that 
the State was "precluded" from presenting any forthcoming information at trial 
regarding the further narrowing of the alleged date of offense because it previously 
failed to do so when given sufficient notice and opportunity (9/21/99 Tr. at 40-43). 
However, after Nelson-Waggoner provided a solid alibi defense, the trial court reneged 
on its position that the State would not be allowed to change the information, even at 
trial. 
The trial court's acceptance of the State's theory of the case by instructing the 
jury that the alleged offense occurred on November 17, 1996, allowed the State to 
circumvent Nelson-Waggoner's repeated attempts for a bill of particulars, even though 
the trial court previously stated that the State would be precluded from talking about a 
specific date to the jury through statement or testimony. This rare procedural anomaly 
eliminated Nelson-Waggoner's ability to effectively attack the credibility of K.W. and 
prejudiced his substantial rights by eliminating much of his alibi defense because the 
jury instruction rendered this defense irrelevant. Additionally, by instructing the jury 
that the alleged offense occurred on November 17, the trial court overstepped its 
authority and eliminated the jury as fact finder as to when and if the assault occurred. 
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Thus, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury that the alleged offense 
occurred on November 17, 1996, and this error should have been obvious to the trial 
court. As shown above in point A, it is the duty of the jury, not the trial court, to 
determine a discrepancy on the date of an alleged offense which affects the credibility 
of the witness. See Wilson, 642 P.2d at 396. Moreover, the State did not amend the 
criminal information in good faith considering that the only new information it obtained 
as to the alleged date of the offense was Nelson-Waggoner's solid alibi and therefore 
the amended information was done solely to avoid Nelson-Waggoner's alibi defense. 
The trial court adopted the state's theory of the case by instructing the jury as to 
the date of the offense which resulted in a manifest injustice that prejudiced Nelson-
Waggoner 's substantial constitutional rights. This plain error was harmful because 
Nelson-Waggoner's conviction was based solely on the testimony of K.W. The State 
offered no physical evidence of any assault and Nelson-Waggoner was severely limited 
in questioning K.W.'s credibility and effectively impeded from presenting his theory of 
the case to the jury. 
Accordingly, Nelson-Waggoner asks this Court to reach the merits of this issue 
under the plain error doctrine, or under the exceptional circumstances doctrine, or 
under the manifest injustice standard of review. The trial court clearly erred in 
allowing the State to amend the information in this case two days before trial and erred 
in instructing the jury as to the date of offense and these procedural anomalies 
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prejudiced Nelson-Waggoner's substantial constitutional rights and require a reversal of 
his conviction. 
II. NELSON-WAGGONER WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO COMPETENT AND EFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL 
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that trial counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient and that he was harmed by these deficiencies. 
A. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to amendment of the 
information. 
As explained above and as explained in Nelson-Waggoner's original brief, the 
trial court erred when it permitted the State to amend the information. Should this 
Court decline to review the issue set forth in Point I, Nelson-Waggoner asserts that this 
Court should examine this issue in regards to whether his trial counsel was ineffective. 
Rule 4(d) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not permit amendment of 
information before the verdict if it prejudices any substantial right of the defendant. In 
light of the procedural history of the case, the preliminary hearing testimony of K. W., 
the repeated attempts of the defense for a bill of particulars/more specification of date 
and time of offense and the trial court's decision to deny that request but to preclude the 
State from eliciting a specific date through statement or testimony, trial counsel's 
failure to object to the amendment and to the jury being instructed only as to November 
17th date constitutes a deficient performance. 
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Moreover, contrary to the position of the State, Nelson-Waggoner was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance. First, had trial counsel objected to 
the amendment of information and pointed out the fact that it is the duty of the jury to 
determine when and if the incident occurred and to determine the credibility of K. W. in 
light of her preliminary hearing testimony and Nelson-Waggoner's alibi defense, the 
trial court probably would have dismissed the State's motion for amendment of 
information. Second, had Nelson-Waggoner been tried under the original information 
and been given the opportunity to present his theory of the case and to question K.W. 's 
credibility in light of her preliminary hearing testimony, there is a reasonable 
probability "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). But the jury was 
denied this opportunity and still took about 4.5 hours to deliberate before reaching a 
verdict (Br.Aplt. at 5). 
B. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's 
numerous indirect references to Nelson-Waggoner's failure to testify made 
during closing argument. 
The State's closing argument contained at least 10 indirect references to Nelson-
Waggoner's failure to testify which were highly inflammatory and prejudicial. These 
numerous comments invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from Nelson-
Waggoner's silence and trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to 
object to these comments or ask the trial court for a curative instruction. Because 
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Nelson-Waggoner's conviction was based solely on the testimony of one witness, 
K.W., with no physical evidence to support her physical assault accusation, the 
prosecution's comments constitute constitutional error that was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
1. The prosecution's comments during closing argument were 
inappropriate and infringed on Nelson-Waggoner's Fifth Amendment 
rights. 
The numerous indirect references made by the prosecution during closing 
argument were intended to leave the jury with the impression that because Nelson-
Waggoner did not testify, he must be guilty and the alleged victim's accusations must 
be true. These numerous indirect references could reasonably be interpreted by the 
jury to draw an adverse inference from Nelson-Waggoner's silence. See State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah 1987). 
In the case at bar, the State claims that the numerous indirect references made by 
the prosecution during closing argument refered to the defense witnesses' inability to 
explain where Nelson-Waggoner was on November 17, 1996 (Br.App. at 21-26). The 
State claims that comments one through five and nine were a "fair response to defense 
counsel's opening statement," comment six "referred to evidence that could have been 
supplied by defense witnesses other than defendant," and comments seven, eight, and 
ten were "fair rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument (Br.App. at 27-28). 
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The State further refers to several cases, attempting to show why each of these 
indirect references to Nelson-Waggoner's silence were "fair." However, these cases 
are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 
In Tillman, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor indirectly commented on 
his failure to testify at trial, although he failed to make contemporaneous objections to 
the allegedly improper comments. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553. There were only a few 
comments made by the prosecution that can be construed as indirect comments on 
defendant's failure to testify at trial, thus implying guilt (the full extent is cited in the 
original brief). The most blatant indirect comment on defendant's silence was where 
the prosecution referred to defense counsel arguing that the criminal system had failed, 
and the prosecution stated: 
No system in the world will work without the person himself humility-wise and 
with remorse saying, T want it to work,' and you haven't heard Elroy Tillman 
say that. In fact, if you have looked at Elroy Tillman you probably haven't seen 
one ounce of remorse other than to cast blame on the State's witnesses or the 
system or his being black or whatever else you want to characterize the blame 
as. 
Id. at 554. This Court held that this remark and a few others would not "naturally and 
necessarily [be] construed by a juror as a comment on defendant's silence." Id. 
Further, assuming that the comments constituted a constitutional violation, this Court 
determined that the prosecution's indirect comments about the defendant's silence for 
not taking the stand were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 555. In making 
this determination, this Court reviewed the fact that the evidence of defendant's guilt 
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was "overwhelming," "the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive," and the 
trial judge specifically instructed the jury "that no presumption adverse to [defendant 
Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness 
stand." Id, at 555. 
In State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the prosecution made a single 
comment which the defendant claimed prejudiced his right not to testify. At closing 
argument, the prosecutor stated: 
I heard no evidence, evidence [sic] from the witness stand about coercion or 
about inducing somebody to say anything about something that didn't happen. I 
heard no evidence that supports any other theory in this case than the theory that 
was presented by the State of Utah, that he's guilty of first degree murder. 
Id, at 891. This Court affirmed the conviction, finding "the comment was made in the 
context of focusing the jury's attention on defendant's confession," and "the statement 
was isolated." Id, 
In State v. Bailey, 111 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985), the defendant argued that a single 
comment made by the prosecution, "Have we heard any testimony in this case that says 
that the analysis done by [the Officer] on these fingerprints is incorrect?", constituted 
prejudicial error. Id, at 285. This Court found that this statement "was not a reference 
to the defendant's failure to testify but rather, taken in context, was a comment on the 
weight of the evidence." Id, at 286. Moreover, even assuming that the single comment 
was improper, this Court found it was not prejudicial because "of the other evidence 
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establishing the defendant's guilt...., defense counsel objected to the comment, and the 
trial judge immediately admonished the jury not to consider the statement." Id. 
The State also cites several non-binding decisions to support its claim that the 
prosecutor's indirect comments were fair. In Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1141 
(Indiana 1997), the defendant claimed that the prosecution's comment in closing 
argument constituted reversible error. Id, at 1148. The prosecutor made the comment 
after informing the trial judge and defense counsel at a bench conference "that he 
intended to tell the jury there had been no evidence presented to explain why the 
defendant would confess to a crime he didn't commit." Id. The defense objected but 
the trial judge allowed it. Id. The prosecution "continued his closing argument and 
reminded the jury that he had told them in his opening statement that the defendant 
confessed to killing the four victims with his shotgun. He stated it was self-evident 
'that no one freely and voluntarily confesses to a murder unless they're guilty.' He then 
challenged defense counsel to explain why a person would voluntarily confess to a 
crime they did not commit." Id. The court found "the jury in this case could not 
reasonably have interpreted the prosecutor's comments as suggestion to infer guilt from 
the defendant's silence." Id. at 1149. Moreover, the state presented "substantial 
evidence of the defendant's guilt," and even if the comments had been in error, they 
would have been harmless. Id. at 1149 n. 10. 
The State also refers to State v. Williams, 490 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio, 1986), where 
the prosecution stated the following during closing argument: 
17 
Here they [witnesses] come in and testify to you what this man [appellant] told 
them. And, again, ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, they [appellant] tell you 
they [witnesses] were lying, but they offer no evidence to rebut that. They could 
have brought somebody through those door and put them on the stand and say, 
'No, [the witnesses] were lying. It never took place.' There is absolutely no 
evidence to contradict what they testified to, ladies and gentlemen. 
Id. at 910. The court held "A reference by the prosecutor in closing argument to 
uncontradicted evidence is not a comment on the accused's failure to testify, where the 
comment is directed to the strength of the state's evidence and not to the silence of the 
accused," and affirmed the conviction. Id. 
Further, in State v. LeFever, 313 S.E. 2d 599 (N.C. App. 1984), the prosecution 
commented "several times that the evidence was 'uncontradicted.' He farther 
commented, 'There has not been any evidence you have heard but what you find she 
has told you the truth.'" Id. at 603. The North Carolina Court of Appeals took the 
position that "a bare statement to the effect that the State's evidence is uncontradicted is 
not an improper reference to the defendant's failure to testify," and found no prejudicial 
error. Id. (citations omitted). 
The State also cites Davis v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1095 (Ind. App. 1997), to 
support its position (Br. App. at 17). However, in Davis, the prosecution's indirect 
comments about the defendant's failure to testify were found improper. Id at 1098. The 
prosecution made "several" indirect comments about defendant not testifying, "the 
most troubling" being "[Defendant] said he took the car. There is nothing to controvert 
that. There is no evidence saying that isn't so. There's not even an argument that he 
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didn't say that." Id. The defendant argued that since he and the witness were the only 
witnesses able to testify about the incident, "any comment on the uncontradicted nature 
of the State's case necessarily highlights for the jury his failure to testify." Id. at 1097. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals determined that "a reasonable jury could have taken that 
comment as an invitation to consider [defendant's] failure to testify as an inference of 
guilt....The prosecutor's comments were improper." Id. at 1098. 
In State v. Adamson, 680 P.2d 1259 (Ariz. App. 1984), the prosecution 
allegedly made a single indirect comment on the defendant's right not to testify. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals did not find "the prosecutor's comment was adverse in this 
case."/d. at 1261. 
All of the cases cited by the State to support its claim that the ten indirect 
references to Nelson-Waggoner's silence were fair are factually distinguishable from 
the present case. In Tillman, Carter, and Bailey, the prosecution's comments were not 
considered prejudicial based on essentially three factors: 1) the overwhelming evidence 
of defendant's guilt, 2) the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive, and 3) the 
trial judge gave a curative instruction. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555; see also Carter, 
776 P.2d at 891; and see Bailey, 111 P.2d at 286. However, in the case at bar, 
Nelson-Waggoner's conviction was not based on overwhelming evidence since it was 
based solely on the testimony of one witness, and the State offered no physical evidence 
of an assault. Moreover, the prosecution's comments were extensive as opposed to 
isolated where he indirectly referred at least ten times to Nelson-Waggoner's silence (in 
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Carter and Bailey, there was only a single comment). And, the trial judge did not give 
any curative instruction to the jury; he only read the jury instructions. 
The non-binding cases cited by the State are also distinguishable on factual 
grounds. In Ben-Yisrayl, the defendant confessed to the crime and the prosecution's 
statements regarded this confession and the lack of evidence to put this confession in 
doubt. Ben-Yisrayl, 690 N.E.2d at 1148. Further, the conviction was affirmed because 
of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. Williams and Adamson regard only a single, 
indirect comment about defendants' failure to testify which was directed towards the 
weight of the evidence. See Williams, 490 N.E.2d at 910; see also Adamson, 680 P.2d 
at 1261. Again in LeFever, that court held "a bare statement to the effect that the 
State's evidence is uncontradicted is not an improper reference to the defendant's 
failure to testify." LeFever, 313 S.E. 2d at 603. 
These cases are factually distinguishable because Nelson-Waggoner never 
confessed, there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the prosecution made at 
least ten indirect references to his silence, not just a single, isolated reference. The 
rhetorical impact of these numerous comments is serious because it lead the jury to 
draw an adverse inference from Nelson-Waggoner's silence. Nelson-Waggoner's trial 
counsel was deficient for not objecting to these prejudicial comments. 
The State further argues that comments were fair because of defense counsel's 
opening statement and closing argument (Br.App. at 15). The State claims that the 
numerous indirect comments regarding Nelson-Waggoner's silence regarded the 
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defense witnesses' failure to contradict K.W.'s testimony (Br.App. at 21-28). 
However, a close review of all the indirect inferences to Nelson-Waggoner's silence 
and the comments surrounding each incidence shows that the prosecution was doing 
more than just pointing out the defense witnesses' failure to explain where Nelson-
Waggoner was on November 17, 1996. The prosecution repeatedly stated to the jury 
that no one but K.W. told you what went on that day and that has not been 
controverted. These statements repeatedly enforced in the jurors' minds that Nelson-
Waggoner did not testify and therefore he must be guilty. 
2. Nelson-Waggoner was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient 
performance. 
First, for the above reasons and the reasons outlined in the original brief, the 
prosecution improperly commented on Nelson-Waggoner's failure to testify. Second, 
the evidence of Nelson-Waggoner's guilt was based on a single witness with no 
corroborating physical evidence. There was also evidence negating K.W.'s credibility, 
but the trial court effectively impeded the jury from considering this evidence when it 
accepted the State's theory of the case. 
Finally, the State relies on non-binding precedence that is distinguishable from 
the facts of this case to support its claim that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Br.App. at 31). In United States v. Gray, 87 F.3d 1315, 3, 1996 
WL 294455 (6th Cir. 1996), the prosecution made a single, isolated indirect remark on 
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defendant's failure to testify, whereas in the present case, the prosecution made at least 
ten indirect comments on Nelson-Waggoner's failure to testify. 
Thus, the numerous indirect comments were not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt and Nelson-Waggoner's trial counsel's failure to object to these comments was 
prejudicial. 
3. The decision not to object was not reasonable trial strategy. 
The State claims that defense counsel's performance was not deficient because it 
was "sound trial strategy" and in the alternative, it was "invited error" (Br.App. at 31-
32). 
Defense counsel's failure to object was not sound trial strategy. In defense 
counsel's response for a motion for new trial, he explains that he did not object to 
prosecution's comments because he felt: 
The prosecutor made no such direct reference to the defendants failure to testify, 
but made a series of references which in defendant's opinion, when taken in 
total, clearly demonstrate that the prosecution was calling the attention of the 
jury to the fact, that only one person could have provided the answers to refute 
the testimony of the alleged victim, [K.W.], and that was the defendant. 
(R. 349-50). Then, defense counsel states that he did not object to the prosecution's 
closing statements for several reasons: (1) he did not want to interrupt the prosecutor; 
(2) he felt the curative instruction had little effect; and (3) the cumulative effect of the 
prosecutors statements, coupled with the knowledge that the parties now have that the 
jury was at least at one point during the proceedings, dead-locked (R. 350). 
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Thus, defense counsel did not object because he did not consider the prejudicial 
statements harmful until after he saw that the jury was dead-locked and after he 
reviewed the record and saw, according to defense counsel, the "cumulative effect" of 
the numerous references to Neslon-Waggoner's failure to testify. 
Moreover, this Court specifically forbid defense counsel from waiting until after 
the verdict and then raise the motion for a new trial based on the prosecutor's improper 
comments. See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982). The law is clear that 
any objection must be made before the verdict to allow the judge an opportunity to cure 
any inappropriate comments made by the prosecutor; defense counsel's failure to timely 
object prejudiced Nelson-Waggoner and denied him his Fifth Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Nelson-
Waggoner asks this Court to reverse his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, a first 
degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [U_ day of June, 2003. 
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23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this /<* day of June, 2003. 
^1-U^^^ <f^J*^~y 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
24 
